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Judging During Crises: Can Judges Protect the Facts?
Lissa Griffin*
With the advent of instantaneous information and the trend toward
shrinking adherence to the truth, the conversation surrounding the ability of
judges to conduct outside research into the matters before them is gaining
urgency. In a “post-truth” world, the role that the judiciary plays in our
democracy must shift from trier of fact to guardian of factual integrity. And
to do this, the professional ethics rules assigned to the judiciary may need
re-evaluation.
This Essay argues that the judiciary’s ambivalence to its role as fact
finder must be overcome, and where appropriate, judges may be empowered
to seek out supplemental information to be shared with the parties to better
identify the truth at the center of the controversy. Further, in light of the
many powers judges already possess to investigate the facts, including to
elicit witness testimony, further expanding the courts’ powers to research
the matters before them will not undermine the unbiased nature of the
judiciary. It will, rather, strengthen previously sanctioned powers of
investigation to better protect against the ever-shifting political tides keen to
influence the judicial outcomes handed down from the court.
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INTRODUCTION
It has been said that we live in a uniquely divisive time. In the United
States, everything seems politicized. The ability to engage in meaningful
differences of opinion has evaporated. We have replaced it with
partisan—nearly religious—adherence to extreme views. There is lying
and bullying, executive and legislative dysfunction. There is protest, and
there is violence. There is distrust and massive fear of “the other”—
people of different colors, backgrounds, or nationalities.1 Many causes
have been cited, including technology’s unprecedented ability to grant
universal and immediate access to information;2 a “balkanized media”;3
and, of course, blind partisanship in the legislative4 and executive
branches.5
Thinking about this Chicago Eight symposium has raised the question
for me: Is this really so unique? Is this the first time in our nation’s history
that we have been so divided (excluding the Civil War, of course)? What
about the 1960s and 1970s and the political and cultural breakdown that
ultimately played out in Judge Hoffman’s courtroom in the Chicago Eight
case? “Fascists” versus “anarchists”? Lying, distrust, polarization, fear,

1. Examples of this phenomenon are well documented. See, e.g., Eddie S. Glaude, Jr., Don’t Let
the Loud Bigots Distract You. America’s Real Problem with Race Cuts Far Deeper, TIME (Sept. 6,
2018), http://time.com/5388356/our-racist-soul/; Richard J. Reddick, Commentary, Existing While
Black: Irrational Fear Is the New Breed of Racism, FORTUNE (May 11, 2018),
http://fortune.com/2018/05/11/black-yale-student-napping-racism-childish-gambino-this-isamerica/.
2. See, e.g., JACK FULLER, WHAT IS HAPPENING TO NEWS: THE INFORMATION EXPLOSION AND
THE CRISIS IN JOURNALISM ix, 2–3 (2010); MICHAEL BARTHEL, AMY MITCHELL & JESSE
HOLCOMB, PEW RESEARCH CTR., MANY AMERICANS BELIEVE FAKE NEWS IS SOWING
CONFUSION (2016), https://www.journalism.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2016/12/PJ_2016.12.
15_fake-news_FINAL.pdf; STANFORD HISTORY EDUC. GRP., EVALUATING INFORMATION: THE
CORNERSTONE OF CIVIC ONLINE REASONING 4–5 (2016), https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/
druid:fv751yt5934/SHEG%20Evaluating%20Information%20Online.pdf; Jeffrey Gottfried &
Elisa Shearer, News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2016, PEW RES. CTR. (May 26, 2016),
https://www.journalism.org/2016/05/26/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-2016/.
3. See David Nakamura, Media Critic Obama Is Worried that “Balkanized” Media Is Feeding
Partisanship, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2016), https:/www.washingtonpost.com/politics/mediacritic-obama-is-worried-that-balkanized-media-are-feeding-partisanship/2016/03/27/8c72b408f1e3-11e5-89c3-a647fcce95e0_story.html.
4. See Sarah Binder, The Dysfunctional Congress, 18 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 85 (2015); M.
Anthony Mills, The Tragicomedy of Congressional Dysfunction, REALCLEARPOLICY (June 8,
2018), https://www.realclearpolicy.com/articles/2018/06/08/the_tragicomedy_of_congressional_
dysfunction_110664.html.
5. See BOB WOODWARD, FEAR: TRUMP IN THE WHITE HOUSE xxii (2018); Jamelle Bouie, The
Incapacitated President, SLATE (Sept. 5, 2018, 5:34 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/
2018/09/bob-woodwards-fear-trump-in-the-white-house-raises-the-specter-of-the-25thamendment.html.
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violence, dysfunction?
Weren’t we then “uniquely” divided, uniquely distrustful?6 If not,
didn’t we think we were? The executive branch was widely considered to
be lying to the public about the Vietnam War,7 while the War led to
substantial public disillusionment8 and congressional dissension.9 The
truth was elusive. The government not only lied to the public about the
War, it also conducted illegal surveillance on a wide and unregulated
scale.10 And it lied about that too.11 Public distrust was rampant.
Mainstream culture hated and feared the counterculture and vice versa;
the counterculture encouraged an ethos and lifestyle reviled by
mainstream Americans who believed in traditional values.
Counterculture enclaves grew; communities, like universities, divided.12
Protests, active and peaceful, were frequent.13 There was talk but no
listening; there was no meeting of the minds. Eventually, there was
violence.14 These two sides—politically and culturally divided—met in
Judge Hoffman’s courtroom. Others in this symposium have written
about the role of some judges during that time in protecting justice and
Judge Hoffman’s failure to do so.15
There are obvious differences between today and the 1960s–1970s—
twenty-four-hour news and the internet, for example—but the sense of a
national nervous breakdown seems similar. And then, as now, the courts
were confronted with and tasked to resolve deeply important social and
6. Kimberly Brazier, Social Change in the 1960s Timeline, PREZI (June 5, 2013),
https://prezi.com/og7tczoxgma8/social-change-in-the-1960s-timeline/;
1960s,
HIST.,
https://www.history.com/topics/1960s (last visited July 22, 2019) (“The 1960s were one of the
most tumultuous and divisive decades in world history, marked by the civil rights
movement, the Vietnam War and antiwar protests, political assassinations and the
emerging ‘generation gap.’”).
7. Daniel Ellsberg, Lying About Vietnam, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2001),
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/29/opinion/lying-about-vietnam.html.
8. Vietnam War Protests, HIST. (Feb. 22, 2010), https://www.history.com/topics/vietnamwar/vietnam-war-protests.
9. Julian E. Zeilzer, How Congress Got Us Out of Vietnam, AM. PROSPECT (Feb. 19, 2007),
http://prospect.org/article/how-congress-got-us-out-vietnam.
10. See United States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424 (C.D. Cal. 1971); FRANK J. DONNER, THE
AGE OF SURVEILLANCE (1980).
11. See supra note 10.
12. Lyle Denniston, The Campus and the Vietnam War: Protest and Tragedy, NAT’L CONST.
CTR. (Sept. 26, 2017), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/the-campus-and-the-vietnam-warprotest-and-tragedy; Daniel S. Levy, Behind the Anti-War Protests That Swept America in 1968,
TIME (Jan. 19, 2018), http://time.com/5106608/protest-1968/.
13. Lists of Protests Against the Vietnam War, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lists_
of_protests_against_the_Vietnam_War (last updated June 26, 2019) [hereinafter Protests Against
the Vietnam War].
14. Denniston, supra note 12; Protests Against the Vietnam War, supra note 13.
15. See, e.g., Ellen Yaroshefsky, Judge Damon Keith: The Judicial Antidote to Julius Hoffman,
50 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 989 (2019).
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political issues. Then, as now, the battle for the truth raged. Today, of
course, we are said to live in a “post-truth”16 world in which it has
become acceptable to say there are “facts” and “alternative facts,”17
“news” and “fake news.”18 Truth has become subjective; a common
understanding of reality is missing. In the time of the Chicago Eight, the
lying, distrust, demonization, and fear permeated society, but at that
point, some generally accepted, if tenuous, respect for reality remained.
That no longer seems possible. We know some of what judges did to
ensure justice in the 1960s and 1970s.19 Does the current incarnation of
political upheaval and its challenges to factual truth require anything new
from the courts?
This Essay addresses the question of what the courts can do in a socalled “post-truth” universe to protect the judicial system from
“alternative” facts. It questions whether the traditionally passive,
uninformed, referee role envisioned for a judge in the U.S. adversarial
system is enough today. To protect the factual integrity of their decisions,
should judges be permitted to take part in the investigation of the facts?
A good example of judicial fact investigation recently came to light
when Justice Sotomayor looked at a website and referred to it during oral
argument in NIFLA v. Becerra.20 That case involved a challenge to a state
rule requiring clinics that do not have doctors available to disclose that
fact. Focusing on the claim that the clinics’ operating model lures women
inside by pretending that they offer medical services, Justice Sotomayor
indicated that she had looked at a clinic’s website, which showed “a
woman on the home page with a uniform”21 and opined that these sites
might well mislead a woman into “thinking she was about to see a
doctor.”22 The reaction was swift. Justice Kennedy immediately scolded
16. “Post-truth” is defined as “circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in
shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief.” Post-truth, OXFORD ONLINE
DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/post-truth (last visited July 22, 2019).
17. Eric Bradner, Conway: Trump White House Offered ‘Alternative Facts’ on Crowd Size,
CNN (Jan. 23, 2017, 12:38 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/22/politics/kellyanne-conwayalternative-facts.
18. Danielle Kurtzleben, With ‘Fake News,’ Trump Moves from Alternative Facts to Alternative
Language, NPR (Feb. 17, 2017, 8:27 PM), http://www.npr.org/2017/02/17/515630467/with-fakenews-trump-moves-from-alternative-facts-to=-alternative-language.
19. For example, Judge Damon Keith entered an order requiring the government to disclose
information about its wiretapping scheme. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 15, at 1001.
20. Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138
S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (No. 16-1140), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_
transcripts/2017/16-1140_o759.pdf [hereinafter Becerra Transcript].
21. Id.
22. Linda Greenhouse, How Judges Know What They Know, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/29/opinion/supreme-court-judges-decisions.html; see also
Becerra Transcript, supra note 20, at 18 (statement of Sotomayor, J.) (“I looked at one [of the
websites] . . . [and] a reasonable person could look at this website and think you’re giving medical
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her for going outside the record23 (although she did not—the website had
been cited in an amicus brief),24 and articles and analysis ensued.25 But
there are even better, if less notorious, cases of judges doing (or failing
to do) independent factual investigation, with various results.26
In Part I, this Essay first attempts to posit a working definition of
“fact,” and to describe (and critique) the current analysis of what kinds of
facts can be accepted into evidence without the traditional protections of
the adversary process (so-called legislative facts) and what facts cannot
(so-called adjudicative facts). It also introduces the notion of “systemic
fact,” which is data accessible to the courts that arise from the judicial
process itself.27 Courts can and should use these sorts of facts to test the
credibility of repeat government players either by traditional use of
judicial notice or simply on notice to the parties. Part II analyzes the legal
and ethical rules that govern the court’s fact-gathering authority. These
include judicial fact-gathering powers recognized historically by
common law and, since 1975, in the Federal Rules of Evidence: judicial
notice, the court’s ability to call witnesses, and the court’s ability to
question witnesses. Ethical constraints exist in the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct, including Rule 2.9—the absolute ethical prohibition
against independent fact investigation. Part III analyzes the reasons why
the court’s proper role may include an expanded power to gather facts
independently, on notice to the parties, the current need for the courts to
do so, and any lessons to be drawn from the Chicago Eight and other
examples of judging during the turmoil of the 1960s and 70s.
I. DEFINING AND CATEGORIZING “FACT”
At the outset, we need a working definition of “fact.” We seem to have
lost a general understanding of what that means. Unfortunately,
dictionary definitions are not particularly helpful, as they generally define
“fact” by including adjectives that more or less beg the question. For
advice . . . .”).
23. Becerra Transcript, supra note 20, at 22 (statement of Kennedy, J.).
24. Brief for Amici Curiae California Women’s Law Center et al. in Support of Respondents at
11, Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (No. 16-1140), 2018
WL 1156614.
25. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Rule: (Other) Justices Shouldn’t Conduct
Independent Research, WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
courts_law/supreme-court-rule-other-justices-shouldnt-conduct-independent-research/2018/03/
25/7a4f790a-2ebd-11e8-b0b0-f706877db618_story.html; Greenhouse, supra note 22; Mark
Sherman & Jessica Gresko, Sotomayor Rapped for Surfing the Web, U.S. NEWS: SUPREME CT.
NOTEBOOK (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/california/articles/201803-22/supreme-court-notebook-sotomayor-rapped-for-surfing-the-web.
26. See infra Part III.
27. Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in Criminal
Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049 (2016).
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example, Meriam Webster defines a fact as “something that has actual
existence,” “an actual occurrence,” “a piece of information presented as
having objective reality,” “the quality of being actual,” or “a thing
done.”28 A better definition may be “an actual thing or happening, which
must be proved at trial by presentation of evidence and which is evaluated
by the finder of fact (a jury in a jury trial, or by the judge if he/she sits
without a jury).”29 Certainly, in the law, a factual claim is one that can
be, and is required to be, supported by evidence.30 Another part of the
definition might be that a fact is something that can be falsified, that is,
tested as true or false with a “degree of detached certainty.” 31 So, as a
working definition of fact, we might use “information that must be
supported by evidence and can be tested as true or false.”
Generally in our adversarial system, facts are presented in evidence by
testimony or real proof offered by the parties and subject to adversarial
testing. There are exceptions, of course, and one of them is a category of
facts that may be admitted in evidence through judicial notice without the
guarantees of adversarial testing. In 1942, Kenneth Culp Davis published
a law review article that originally addressed the administrative
adjudication process. He concluded that a court’s power to consider facts
outside of the adversarial process has traditionally been analyzed by
dividing the universe of fact in two. The first, “adjudicative facts,” were
defined as the facts underlying a given controversy, the facts in the street,
the behavior of the parties, the “whodunit facts.”32 Such facts are subject
to high standards and strict rules of judicial notice, now contained in Rule
201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.33 As to adjudicative facts, only
28. Fact, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/fact (last visited July 22, 2019).
29. Fact, FREE DICIONARY BY FARLEX, https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/fact (last
visited July 22, 2019).
30. Allison Orr Larsen, Constitutional Law in an Age of Alternative Facts, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV.
175, 185 n.42 (2018).
31. Saul M. Pilchen, Politics v. the Cloister: Deciding When the Supreme Court Should Defer
to Congressional Factfinding Under the Post-Civil War Amendments, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
337, 378–40 (1984); Larsen, supra note 30, at 184–85 nn.40–42. It is worth pointing out here that
we are not concerned as much with the definitional distinction between “law” and “fact” that is
traditionally the focus of the law. Here we are concerned with arriving at a definition of objective,
verifiable reality.
32. Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process,
55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 365–66, 402–03 (1942); Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court
Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255, 1256 n.5, 1264–65 (2012).
33. FED. R. EVID. 201:
(a) Scope. This rule governs judicial notice of an adjudicative fact only, not a legislative
fact.
(b) Kinds of Facts That May Be Judicially Noticed. The court may judicially notice a
fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it:
(1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or
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those that are indisputable, so well known locally as to be indisputable,
or taken from an indisputably reliable source, can be noticed without the
protections of the adversarial process. On the other hand are “legislative
facts,” that is, facts that are not the subject of the conduct of the parties,
that do not arise out of the individual controversy, that “transcend[] the
particular dispute,”34 and that are based on social, scientific, or cultural
phenomena that occur apart from a given case. These are explicitly
removed from the strictures of Rule 201. In fact, there are no limitations
on a court’s power to consider those facts outside of the adversarial
process, even if they are dispositive.35 This was the case under the
common law before the Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted.36 They
play a very significant role in the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence.37
A recently identified category of fact has been termed “systemic
fact.”38 Although described as falling between the traditional dichotomy
of adjudicative/legislative fact, these facts more closely fit into the
category of legislative facts. Criminal courts have access to data that
would provide a factual basis for much of their decision-making that they
currently do not collect or use. Examples of such information would be
information about actual police conduct in arrests and searches or
interrogation; search warrant returns and results; inconsistent factual
assertions by repeat actors; bail statistics (including reoffending or
absconding); charging and overcharging patterns; and Brady
(2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned.
(c) Taking Notice. The court:
(1) may take judicial notice on its own; or
(2) must take judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied with the
necessary information.
(d) Timing. The court may take judicial notice at any stage of the proceeding.
(e) Opportunity to Be Heard. On timely request, a party is entitled to be heard on the
propriety of taking judicial notice and the nature of the fact to be noticed. If the court
takes judicial notice before notifying a party, the party, on request, is still entitled to be
heard.
(f) Instructing the Jury. In a civil case, the court must instruct the jury to accept the
noticed fact as conclusive. In a criminal case, the court must instruct the jury that it may
or may not accept the noticed fact as conclusive.
34. Larsen, supra note 32, at 1256–57; see also Robert E. Keeton, Legislative Facts and Similar
Things: Deciding Disputed Premise Facts, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1, 11 (1988).
35. Larsen, supra note 32, at 1258–59.
36. See FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rule subdivision (b)
(“With respect to judicial notice of adjudicative facts, the tradition has been one of caution in
requiring that the matter be beyond reasonable controversy. This tradition of circumspection
appears to be soundly based, and no reason to depart from it is apparent.”).
37. See infra Part II.A.2.
38. This term was coined by Professor Andrew Manuel Crespo. See Crespo, supra note 27, at
2052 (“[S]ystemic facts look inward: they are facts about the criminal justice system itself, and
about the institutional behavior of its key actors.”).

864

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 50

compliance.39 These facts have not traditionally been subject to judicial
notice; however, by way of judicial notice or otherwise, this category of
facts certainly could be, and should be, used to protect the factual
integrity of the courts’ decisions. Courts could apply the same process to
ensure the reliability of other institutional players in civil cases.
For the purpose of this Essay, then, this is our universe of facts.
II. LEGAL AND ETHICAL RESTRAINTS ON JUDICIAL FACT INVESTIGATION
A. The Federal Rules of Evidence and Other Legal Standards
1. FRE 201: Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts
FRE Rule 201 governs judicial notice of adjudicative facts. Before the
Rules were adopted in 1975, judicial notice under the common law
generally permitted a court to recognize objective, provable, or
uncontested facts in order to promote judicial efficiency. 40 A narrow set
of factual categories were regularly judicially noticed, including
geographical, scientific, historical, and local facts or facts that were so
well known in the locality or otherwise that they could be introduced
without proof.41 Courts rarely exercised their powers of judicial notice
under these standards, but analysis focused on the court’s inherent
knowledge of local facts rather than on the source of the information.42
The Federal Rules did not follow this more realistic and flexible
approach to judicial notice. Instead, Congress broadened the power to
judicially notice facts to include facts that were essentially not disputable.
Rule 201(b) provides that a court may take judicial notice of an
adjudicative fact that is “not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1)
is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2)
can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned.”43 Although the types of facts to be
judicially noticed are largely the same, the addition of subdivision (b)(2)
shifts the focus from the knowledge of the judge to the source of the
information. Under that subdivision, while the judge may have no
knowledge of a given fact, it may be judicially noticed if an undisputable
source is available.44 Thus the relevance of facts found on the internet.
As to fairness and notice, subsection (c) permits a court to take judicial

39. Id. at 2088–89.
40. Jeffrey Bellin & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Trial by Google: Judicial Notice in the
Information Age, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1137, 1143–44 (2014).
41. Id. at 1145–47.
42. Id. at 1146–51.
43. FED. R. EVID. 201(b).
44. Bellin & Ferguson, supra note 40, at 1155.
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notice on its own or requires the court to take judicial notice if a party
requests it and gives the court the necessary information.45 Subsection (d)
permits judicial notice at any stage of a proceeding. 46 Subsection (e)
provides that a party is entitled to be heard on the propriety of taking
judicial notice and the nature of the fact to be noticed on timely request.47
If the court takes judicial notice before notifying a party, the party, on
request, is still entitled to be heard.48 Finally, subdivision (f) requires the
court to instruct the jurors that they must accept the noticed fact as
conclusive in a civil case.49 In a criminal case, the jury may or may not
accept the noticed fact as conclusive.50
2. Judicial Notice of Legislative Facts
Although not subject to a federal rule, there is the well-established and
virtually unlimited practice of permitting courts to consider so-called
legislative facts.51 This information is often presented in amicus briefs, a
practice that began with the so-called Brandeis brief,52 through which the
Supreme Court was able to consider social, demographic, and other data
that had not been presented on the record, and even for the first time on
appeal.53 But it is often the subject of “in-house” factual research.54 The
notion behind this concept is that the facts considered are essential to that
part of the judicial decision-making process that involves policy.
Historically, these legislative facts were unlikely to be contested.
However, there is no requirement of indisputability or even reliability.
The practice of taking judicial notice of legislative facts has become
problematic, therefore, as factual claims made by amici have become
both increasingly unreliable, based on inadequate expertise and
unreliable sources, and increasingly partisan.55 In this sense, facts have

45. FED. R. EVID. 201(c).
46. Id. 201(d).
47. Id. 201(e).
48. Id.
49. Id. 201(f).
50. Id.
51. Larsen, supra note 32, at 1258–59.
52. The original Brandeis brief was submitted by Justice Brandeis in Muller v. State of Oregon,
208 U.S. 412 (1908). It was submitted in support of a state law restricting the hours women could
work; it contained two pages of argument followed by more than 100 pages of social science data
and testimony by medical personnel and others about the impact of long work hours. In its decision,
the Supreme Court relied on this data. Id. at 420.
53. For a thorough description of the current practice involving amicus briefs in the Supreme
Court, see Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, The Amicus Machine, 102 VA. L. REV. 1901 (2016).
54. Larsen, supra note 32, at 1278–90.
55. Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L. REV. 1757, 1784–801
(2014).
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been weaponized.56 Despite these developments, there are and continue
to be no restrictions on any court’s power to entertain legislative facts
outside of adversarial testing. This is true whether or not the facts are
dispositive, and they often are.57
Much has been written about the courts’ apparent willingness to rely
on such facts.58 These facts come either from the Court’s own in-house
factual research59 or from the now astounding number of amicus
submissions the Court allows.60 Justice Sotomayor’s recent visit to the
internet—to a website cited by one of the fourty-three amicus briefs—
added fuel to the existing controversy but was really nothing new.61
Much has also been written about the many cases in which legislative
facts recognized and relied on by the Supreme Court have simply been
wrong.62
3. Systemic Facts
While criminal courts are charged with ensuring that the police and
prosecutors comply with constitutional standards, they do so on what is
essentially a case-by-case basis. This “transactional myopia” hinders
their proper institutional role in regulating law enforcement behavior.63
At the same time, ironically, these same courts have unique access to a
broad range of information about the conduct of institutional repeat
players in their own court records. Using the courts’ own systemic facts
would not only give the courts an institutional awareness that would
enable them to better fulfill their role in constitutional criminal
56. Id. at 1767.
57. Professor Larsen reviewed 124 citations to amicus briefs for facts and identified 97 of them
having been “used to answer . . . outcome-determinative questions.” Id. at 1782.
58. Over the last 50 years, the filing of amicus briefs has increased by 800 percent. Id. at 1758.
During the Court’s 2013 Term, 61 of 79 cases involved an amicus brief filed to supplement the
factual record. Id. at 1762. Professor Larsen demonstrates that the Court’s practice has resulted in
its being “inundated with eleventh-hour, untested, advocacy-motivated claims of factual expertise.”
Id. at 1757. These submissions frequently are based on studies the amicus has funded itself;
nevertheless, the Court then cites to the amicus brief as authority for the fact, rather than to any
underlying factual source, resulting in unreliable fact finding. Id. at 1764.
59. According to one source, “90 of the 120 most salient Supreme Court decisions from 2000
to 2010 contained at least one assertion of legislative fact supported by citation.” Larsen, supra
note 32, at 1274. Of those, 77 percent contained at least one authority that was not present in the
briefs. Id.
60. Id. at 1272.
61. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 617 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (chastising
the majority for relying on legislative facts without any demonstration of reliability or adversarial
testing).
62. See Ryan Gabrielson, It’s a Fact: Supreme Court Errors Aren’t Hard to Find, PROPUBLICA
(Oct. 17, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/supreme-court-errors-are-not-hardto-find.
63. Crespo, supra note 27. As discussed supra, Professor Crespo coined the term “systemic
facts.” This section relies heavily on his seminal article.
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supervision of law enforcement behavior, it also would help them ensure
the factual integrity of their decisions.64
Here are some examples. As to the police, criminal courts regulate the
police primarily through the Fourth Amendment doctrine by which police
must make a showing of probable cause to justify their conduct. To do
so, the police must file affidavits supporting search warrants, returns on
those search warrants, post-warrantless arrest affidavits, and, often,
suppression hearing transcripts. These documents are then maintained in
the court’s digital repository, where they may be categorized and
searched in many effective ways. Statements in such documents could be
used for assessing the consistency of claims in subsequent documents,
and their descriptive accuracy, as well as the credibility of repeat
witnesses, and in assessing claims of predictive accuracy. 65
As to the prosecution, lack of information about what prosecutors are
actually doing has been one basis for the courts’ unwillingness to review
the constitutionality of important exercises of prosecutorial discretion.66
And although prosecutorial discretion on an office-wide basis may
impact the results in a given case or the remedies, courts have been
unwilling or unable to look at the conduct of prosecutors office-wide. In
three areas, Brady,67 Batson,68 and Armstrong69 (failure to disclose
exculpatory information, race-based jury selection, and racially
discriminatory charging), courts can keep records that would again be
usable to assess the reliability and credibility of prosecutorial statements
and the constitutionality of prosecutorial practices.70
Professor Crespo suggests that courts could make public whatever
systemic facts they have collected, which would make them available to
public scrutiny and accessible to all litigants.71 Those litigants could then
incorporate such information into their documents, making the systemic
facts a matter of record.72 If that does not occur, “a judge might take
judicial notice of her court’s own systemic facts, after she has afforded

64. Id.
65. Id. at 2070–86.
66. Id. at 2086.
67. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
68. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), modified, Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
69. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
70. Crespo, supra note 27, at 2087–101. For example, there are digitized Brady registries, so
Brady materials are available across cases.
71. Id. at 2115.
72. Larsen, supra note 55, at 1757 (“The number of amicus curiae briefs filed at the Supreme
Court is at an all-time high.”) (citing Paul M. Collins, Jr. & Lisa A. Solowiej, Interest Group
Participation, Competition, and Conflict in the U.S. Supreme Court, 32 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 955,
956 (2007) (“In recent years, amici curiae have participated in over 80 percent of cases heard on
the merits in the U.S. Supreme Court.”)); see also id. at 1758, 1818.
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the parties an opportunity to weigh in on the matter, which again would
hardly be an unusual practice.”73
This is correct, but judicial notice of systemic facts would not be
“usual.” To be sure, courts may take judicial notice of their own records,
that is, of the existence of certain documents and decisions and the dates
and occurrence of proceedings in their own courts. But this practice has
been inconsistent.74 Nevertheless, the traditional judicial notice doctrine
would permit judicial notice of the fact that certain inconsistent claims
and statements contained in court submissions were made, that certain
peremptory challenges were made, or that charges were brought. That
would certainly allow courts to take judicial notice of most systemic facts
for most purposes. The same powers would allow the courts to take
judicial notice of statements by repeat players in pleadings or testimony
in other cases, not for their truth, but for the fact that they were made.
4. FRE Rules 614 and 706: Calling and Questioning Witnesses
Interestingly, several provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence
beyond Rule 201 explicitly permit the court to investigate the facts. Rule
614(a) permits the court to call its own witnesses.75 Rule 614(b) permits
the court to question witnesses called by the parties.76 Rule 614(c) gives
the parties the power to object to the court’s calling or examining a
witness.77 The court clearly has the power to elicit evidence, subject only
to the requirement that it do so impartially. 78 In addition, Rule 706(a)
permits the court to call its own expert witnesses.79 This power has not
been widely exercised,80 but when used is usually invoked by a court
considering complex admissibility questions under Daubert v. Merrell
73. Crespo, supra note 27, at 2115–16.
74. Id. at 2052–53.
75. FED. R. EVID. 614(a) states, “Calling. The court may call a witness on its own or at a party’s
request. Each party is entitled to cross-examine the witness.”
76. FED. R. EVID. 614(b) states, “Examining. The court may examine a witness regardless of
who calls the witness.” See Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987) (recognizing broad authority
to examine a witness).
77. FED. R. EVID. 614(c) states, “Objections. A party may object to the court’s calling or
examining a witness either at that time or at the next opportunity when the jury is not present.”
78. E.g., United States v. Castner, 50 F.3d 1267 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Zhu, 854 F.3d
247 (4th Cir. 2017); United States v. Perez-Melis, 882 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 2018).
79. FED. R. EVID. 706(a) states,
Appointment Process. On a party’s motion or on its own, the court may order the parties
to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed and may ask the parties to
submit nominations. The court may appoint any expert that the parties agree on and any
of its own choosing. But the court may only appoint someone who consents to act.
80. See Bradford H. Charles, Rule 706: An Underutilized Tool to Be Used When Partisan
Experts Become “Hired Guns”, 60 VILL. L. REV. 941 (2015); Stephanie Domitrovich, Mara L.
Merlino & James T. Richardson, State Trial Judge Use of Court Appointed Experts: Survey Results
and Comparisons, 50 JURIMETRICS 371 (2010).
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Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.81
B. The Model Rules of Judicial Conduct
In the U.S. adversary system, the core duties of a judge are fairness
and impartiality.82 This is recognized in many sections of the Model
Rules of Judicial Conduct. Canon 2 provides, “A judge shall perform the
duties of judicial office impartially, competently, and diligently.”83 Rule
2.2 requires “Impartiality and Fairness”: “A judge shall uphold and apply
the law, and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and
impartially.”84 “Impartially” is defined to “mean absence of bias or
prejudice in favor of, or against, particular parties or classes of parties, as
well as maintenance of an open mind in considering issues that may come
before a judge.”85 Rule 1.2, “Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary”
provides that “[a] judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes
public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the
judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety.”86
To ensure impartiality, certain types of ex parte communications are
prohibited in Rule 2.9. Subsection (C) provides: “A judge shall not
investigate facts in a matter independently, and shall consider only the
evidence presented and any facts that may properly be judicially
noticed.”87 Comment 6 explains that “[t]he prohibition against a judge
investigating the facts in a matter extends to information available in all
mediums, including electronic.”88
81. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 116 (1995);
Edward K. Cheng, Independent Judicial Research in the Daubert Age, 56 DUKE L.J. 1263 (2007).
82. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Preamble (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
83. Id. at Canon 2.
84. Id. at r. 2.2.
85. Id. at Terminology.
86. Id. at r. 1.2.
87. Id. at r. 2.9(C).
88. Id. at r. 2.9 cmt. 6. Other parts of Rule 2.9 may be relevant as follows: Subdivision (A)(3)
states that
[a] judge may consult with court staff and court officials whose functions are to aid the
judge in carrying out the judge’s adjudicative responsibilities, or with other judges,
provided the judge makes reasonable efforts to avoid receiving factual information that
is not part of the record, and does not abrogate the responsibility personally to decide the
matter.
Id. at r. 2.9(A)(3). Pursuant to Subdivision (A)(5), “A judge may initiate, permit, or consider any
ex parte communication when expressly authorized by law to do so.” Id. at r. 2.9(A)(5).
Additionally, Subdivision (A)(2) allows a judge to
obtain the written advice of a disinterested expert on the law applicable to a proceeding
before the judge, if the judge gives advance notice to the parties of the person to be
consulted and the subject matter of the advice to be solicited, and affords the parties a
reasonable opportunity to object and respond to the notice and to the advice received.
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This rule is seductively and surprisingly absolute: As to fact
investigation, the court is simply barred. All facts, aside from what the
law says may be judicially noticed, must come from the parties and be
subject to adversarial testing. Comment 6 makes clear that this
prohibition applies to facts available in any medium, including the
internet.89
This rule has two purposes. The first is to prevent a judge from
becoming an unsworn witness against a party. Possibly more importantly,
however, the rule works to protect the bedrock principle that a judge must
be impartial.90 Because investigating facts will inevitably work to the
advantage of one party or another, it is inherently risky, even where the
judge is only after objective truth. Decisions have been reversed where a
sentencing judge “took it upon [himself]” to call the victim’s therapist;91
where a judge in a custody dispute called the children’s school to verify
the truthfulness of the mother’s testimony;92 or where a trial judge denied
a motion to dismiss based on whether the defendant corporation
transacted business in New York after looking at the websites of the
defendant, the defendant’s insurer, and the New York State Department
of Insurance.93 Significantly, however, the parties were not given an
opportunity to respond to the court’s factual findings. Judges have been
disciplined for similar conduct.94
The internet may well have changed things; indeed, much has been
written about the role of judges and the internet.95 Obviously, the internet

Id. at r. 2.9(A)(2). Finally, Rule 2.5(A) requires that “[a] judge shall perform judicial and
administrative duties, competently and diligently.” Id. at r. 2.5(A).
89. See also ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 478 (2017) (discussing
the impact of independent factual rearch by judges utilizing the internet).
90. In addition, Rule 2.2 Comment 1 explains that “[t]o ensure impartiality and fairness to all
parties, a judge must be objective and open-minded.” MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.2
cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014). For an analysis of the rule and cases in which courts have been
reversed or disciplined for independent fact investigation, see Cynthia Gray, Independent
Investigations, JUD. CONDUCT REP., Summer 2012, at 1, 5.
91. State v. McCrary, 676 N.W.2d 116, 125–26 (S.D. 2004).
92. Albert v. Rogers, 57 So. 3d 233, 235–37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
93. NYC Med. & Neurodiagnostic, P.C. v. Republic W. Ins. Co., 798 N.Y.S.2d 309, 312 (N.Y.
App. Term 2004).
94. Gray, supra note 90, at 6–7 (reviewing cases wherein judges have been disciplined for
conducting independent investigations).
95. See, e.g., Bellin & Ferguson, supra note 40 (arguing that internet access “allows judges and
litigants to expand the use of judicial notice in ways that raise significant concerns about
admissibility, reliability, and fair process”); Cheng, supra note 81, at 1266 (contending that judges
should use online resources to conduct their own research); Layne S. Keele, When the Mountain
Goes to Mohammed: The Internet and Judicial Decision-Making, 45 N.M. L. REV. 125 (2014)
(highlighting how judges can obtain information about a case in “just a few mouse clicks”); David
B. Saxe, “Toxic” Judicial Research, N.Y. ST. B.A. J., September 2015, at 36 (surveying the
scholarship.
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provides unparalleled, even heretofore unimaginable, access to
information that did not exist either during the 1960s and 70s or when the
Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted. Some of the information is good
(as in reliable) and some of it is bad (as in uninformed, inaccurate, biased,
hateful, and the like). Has it changed the role of the judge?
The ABA would say no: Comment 6 specifically states that the
prohibition against fact investigation “extends to information available in
all mediums, including electronic.”96 And, in Formal Opinion 478, the
ABA stated that Rule 2.9 prohibits judicial “on-line independent factfinding not tested by the adversary system.”97
III. DISCUSSION
Does the traditional role of the judge in the adversarial process—that
of passive, uninformed referee—work in today’s “post-truth” universe of
alternative facts? Can the courts protect the integrity of their processes
against the force of alternative facts? Does the internet change things?
These are trying times. This Essay suggests that the traditional, passive
role of the U.S. judge may be inadequate to face the “post-truth” era
presented. More engagement in the facts by trial-level judges may be
required to protect the courts in a “post-truth” universe. Courts should be
empowered in some circumstances to investigate and notice facts—on
notice to the parties and with an opportunity to be heard—whenever the
court is deciding a legal issue, for example, admissibility, summary
judgment, or suppression. I am less comfortable when the judge is sitting
as a fact finder, particularly in a criminal trial. In addition, courts must
better use the tools they already have to guard against alternative facts—
judicial notice, the power to call and question witnesses, and the power
to call their own experts—and should be allowed to engage in fact
investigation under limited circumstances to protect against alternative
facts, unreliable “facts,” fake news, and the like. They should become
active fact checkers, too, instead of overtly deferring to the legislature or
covertly acting in deference to the government. In this respect, they have
the power to collect and analyze assertions of repeat institutional players.
Federal district court judges, like Judge Hoffman and the other judges
involved in the 1960s and 70s, may be the best suited to take on this role.
As others have pointed out, they are at the forefront of important
constitutional litigation, litigation that has become particularly factcentric.98 Evidence suggests that judges possess “a specialized form of
96. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.9 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).
97. ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 478 (2017) (discussing
“Independent Factual Research by Judges Via the Internet”).
98. Larsen, supra note 32, at 1308–09 (emphasizing “increased judicial reliance on legislative
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cognitive perception”99 that allows them to counteract the effect of
alternative facts by focusing on the sources of so-called facts and to resist
the kind of self-motivated reasoning that leads others to accept alternative
facts as true.100 In this sense, courts may be better at resisting alternative
facts than, for example, the legislature.
Despite the absolute ethical prohibition against independent judicial
access to the internet, in today’s world, technology’s “gift” of universal,
free access to information must be considered. Indeed, courts are having
a difficult time contending with this phenomenon in an effective way.
Given the ubiquity of information but the ethical prohibition against
accessing it, it is not surprising that the courts’ reaction has been
described as “ambivalent.”101 Indeed, despite the clarity of the ethical
rule, courts do seem to be taking advantage of the ease, efficiency, and
ubiquity of the internet. And despite the high standards of Rule 201, and
the variable reliability, authenticity, and admissibility issues surrounding
information on the internet, courts have taken judicial notice of a variety
of websites, including various government websites,102 Google Maps,103
and even in some cases, Wikipedia,104 to name a few.
In an interesting example of a strand of cases, United States v. Bari
demonstrates the courts’ desire to rely on the internet but their hesitation
in doing so.105 In that case, the district court revoked Bari’s supervised
release status after concluding that he had robbed a bank while on
release.106 The robber had worn a yellow rain hat, and a yellow rain hat
was found in Bari’s landlord’s garage.107 The court considered the hat
“the strongest piece of evidence,” after doing a “Google Search” that

facts” in Supreme Court decisions).
99. Dan M. Kahan et al., “Ideology” or “Situation Sense”? An Experimental Investigation of
Motivated Reasoning and Professional Judgment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 349, 354–55 (2016).
100. Id. at 355.
101. Keele, supra note 95, at 126 (“Because judicial Internet use both offers significant benefits
and poses substantial risks to our justice system, courts and commentators have displayed a
remarkable ambivalence regarding the propriety of online research.”).
102. See Askew v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-767V, 2012 WL 2061804, at *5
(Fed. Cl. May 17, 2012) (judge took judicial notice of facts provided on a website maintained by
the National Institute of Health); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Favino, No. 1:10 CV 571, 2011 WL
1256771, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2011) (taking judicial notice of the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency’s website recognizing that Wells Fargo Bank is a national bank); Davis v. Nice,
No. 5:12 CV 1002, 2012 WL 3961236, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 10, 2012) (district court took
judicial notice of a fact provided on the City of Akron Police Department website).
103. See Bellin & Ferguson, supra note 40, at 1162–63.
104. Id. at 1164 (although “[c]iting Wikipedia is as controversial as it is common” (quoting Fire
Ins. Exch. v. Oltmanns, 285 P.3d 802, 807 (Utah Ct. App. 2012) (Voros, J., concurring))).
105. United States v. Bari, 599 F.3d 176, 181 (2d Cir. 2010).
106. Id. at 178.
107. Id.
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indicated this particular kind of hat was not common.108 The Second
Circuit, noting the reduced evidentiary standards in parole revocation
hearings (including Rule 201), explained that given the ease of access to
the facts, a judge may conduct that sort of independent research to
“confirm[] his intuition on a ‘matter[] of common knowledge.’”109
Another similar example of the ambivalent use of the internet is
presented by Kourkounakis v. Dello Russo,110 over which Judge Rakoff
presided. In that case, the plaintiffs claimed medical malpractice in the
performance of a Lasik procedure that allegedly worsened plaintiff’s
vision so he could not perform daily tasks.111 Judge Jed Rakoff’s law
clerk conducted an internet search that revealed that the plaintiff’s expert
appears to have been occupied sine [sic] 2000 as a managing partner at
Galt Capital, an investment advisory firm, and does not appear to have
practiced medicine since the mid-1990s, does not appear to have a valid
medical license, never specialized or trained in ophthalmology, never
performed or was accredited in LASIK, and never examined the
plaintiff.112

Judge Rakoff informed the parties he would not use the information he
had obtained from the internet, but he granted summary judgment for
defendant.113
Judge Richard Posner, a well-known judicial pragmatist, has been a
vocal advocate of broadening the powers of the federal courts to do
independent internet research in both his scholarship and his decisions.114
In Rowe v. Gibson,115 the plaintiff, a state prisoner, brought a 1983 action
against the prison based on a claim of deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs.116 The trial court had refused his request for the
appointment of counsel and for the appointment of an expert.117 As a
result, the petitioner proceeded pro se based entirely on his own testimony
and on the allegations of his affidavit and complaint.118 The prison
108. Id.
109. Id. at 181 (second brackets in original).
110. Kourkounakis v. Dello Russo, No. 04 Civ. 0586 (JSR), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8020
(S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2005).
111. Id. at *1.
112. Id. at *7.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 139–48 (2013) (reviewing the
benefits of independent judicial research to his decisions); Richard A. Posner, Judicial Opinions
and Appellate Advocacy in Federal Courts—One Judge’s Views, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 3, 11 (2013)
(“The Web is an incredible compendium of data and a potentially invaluable resource for lawyers
and judges that is being underutilized.”).
115. Rowe v. Gibson, 798 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2015).
116. Id. at 623.
117. Id. at 629–30.
118. Id. at 626–27.

874

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 50

presented extremely weak expert evidence of its own through one of the
physicians who treated him but was not a specialist in the appropriate
field.119 The prison moved for summary judgment, and the motion was
granted.120
On appeal, to resolve whether summary judgment was properly
granted on the issue of whether the medical staff’s treatment amounted to
deliberate indifference, the court referred to the Mayo Clinic’s
website.121 In doing so, the court explicitly stated that it was not taking
judicial notice of the contents of the website under Rule 201, recognizing
the high standard for doing so that requires indisputable accuracy. 122 The
court explicitly recognized the high standard for judicial notice and the
very low standard for admission of relevant evidence in an adversarial
proceeding, and suggested it was operating somewhere in the middle.123
The court stated that to refuse to entertain this evidence under the
circumstances (i.e., the inability of the plaintiff to produce expert
testimony and the weakness of the defendant’s expert proof) would be to
essentially “fetishize adversary procedure in a pure eighteenth-century
form, given the inadequacy of the key defense witness.”124 “It is heartless
to make a fetish of adversary procedure if by doing so feeble evidence is
credited because the opponent has no practical access to offsetting
evidence.”125 In addition, the court explained that it was using the
information gathered from the website “only to underscore the existence
of a genuine dispute of material fact created . . . by entirely conventional
evidence,” not to create one.126
Less controversial, perhaps, would be the Seventh Circuit’s decision
in Gilles v. Blanchard.127 In that case, a challenge to a university’s denial
of permission to give a speech on the lawn of the school’s library, Judge
Posner accessed a map of the layout of the school’s library and
downloaded a satellite photograph of the campus.128
It has been suggested that courts should be allowed to do sua sponte
independent scientific or technical research when they are confronted
with complicated scientific issues and can do so consistent with a judge’s
119. Id. at 627.
120. Id. at 623.
121. Id. at 623–26.
122. Id. at 629.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 630. Judge Hamilton concurred in part and dissented in part. He refused to reverse
the grant of summary judgment, which he characterized as “unprecedented, clearly based on
‘evidence’ this appellate court has found by its own internet research.” Id. at 636.
126. Id. at 629.
127. Gilles v. Blanchard, 477 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 2007).
128. Id. at 468.
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ethical role and the parties’ due process rights.129 Judge Jack B.
Weinstein is a strong adherent of this view.130 Presaging thoughts later
expressed by Judge Posner, Judge Weinstein has said, “A rigid
conception of the judge as presiding passively and neutrally over an
adversarial proceeding in which the litigants bear the whole burden of
presentation is sometimes inaccurate and unwise.”131 As Daubert
expanded the role of the courts in considering scientific evidence, and as
research in these areas has exploded, courts are increasingly feeling
pressure in their role as gatekeepers on a variety of unfamiliar subjects.132
There is also growing pressure to prevent against the influence of
partisan, false, or junk science.133 Ethical rules need to be changed to
permit judges to learn what they need to know to render correct decisions.
To the extent that Model Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.9 serves to
limit a judge’s ability to investigate facts and bring them before the
parties, the rule should be changed. Outside the Rule’s ex parte context,
there should no longer be an unequivocal bar to independent fact
investigation though the internet or otherwise. As to questions of law,
courts should have the power to investigate facts independently on notice
to the parties and with an opportunity to be heard, whether the facts be
characterized as adjudicative facts or as legislative facts. Independent fact
investigation would be particularly appropriate (1) where the facts are
used as background, to educate the judge on a complex issue, to confirm
an intuition, or to fill gaps in the evidence on an issue the parties raised,
or (2) where there is inequality in the ability of the parties to produce
evidence on an important issue. Courts are already empowered to call
their own witnesses, both lay and expert, and to question the parties’
witnesses.134 They are also uniquely positioned to investigate and

129. George D. Marlow, From Black Robes to White Lab Coats: The Ethical Implications of a
Judge’s Sua Sponte, Ex Parte Acquisition of Social and Other Scientific Evidence During the
Decision-Making Process, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 291, 293 (1998); see also Jack B. Weinstein,
Limits on Judges Learning, Speaking and Acting—Part I—Tentative First Thoughts: How May
Judges Learn?, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 539, 565 (1994).
130. Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469
(1994).
131. Id. at 539.
132. Marlow, supra note 129, at 296–97.
133. See Larsen, supra note 30, at 190–91, 214 (discussing the weaponization of partisan facts
and its impact on judicial decision-making); see also Rick Anderson, The Fallibility of Forensic
Science: Crime-Solving Tool Can Lead to Wrongful Convictions—and Belated Exonerations, HUM.
RTS. DEF. CTR.: CRIM. LEGAL NEWS (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.criminallegalnews.org/
news/2018/dec/14/fallibility-forensic-science-crime-solving-tool-can-lead-wrongfulconvictionsand-belated-exonerations/ (finding scientific evidence, whether unreliable, mistaken,
invalid, fabricated, or biased, “is the second most common contributing factor to wrongful
convictions”).
134. FED. R. EVID. 706.
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consider their own systemic facts, to take notice of the records of
statements in other cases, and to hold the government accountable for
inconsistencies and unreliability in its agents’ assertions.
Taking cues from Judges Posner and Weinstein, but moving beyond
their positions, there should be a middle road allowing judges to play a
role in generating facts. Contrary to the rigidity of Rule 2.9, that role
would be located somewhere between the strict standards of judicial
notice and the loose standards for admissibility of relevant evidence: it
would be an extension of the judge’s power under the Federal Rules of
Evidence to call witnesses and to question witnesses. In certain
circumstances, a trial judge should be able to both investigate and present
facts, on notice to the parties and with an opportunity to be heard. This
would be proper whenever the court is deciding a legal issue, for example,
admissibility, summary judgment, or suppression. Because of
constitutional due process issues, it would not be appropriate when the
judge is sitting as a fact finder in a criminal case.
The current crisis of confidence and social and political dysfunction
and upheaval supports an expanded judicial role that would include fact
investigation under certain circumstances, with notice to the parties and
an opportunity to be heard. When social cohesion has so broken down
that the definition of “truth” is subjective, the courts should be able to
protect the integrity of their decisions and maintain the necessary respect
for the judicial process.
The requirement of notice and opportunity to be heard is the same as
that required before judicial notice may be taken under Rule 201, and it
ensures the fairness that legal and ethical standards require. The
reliability of any fact judicially presented can be tested. Courts can call
witnesses, question witnesses, and take judicial notice sua sponte: a judge
is allowed to exercise these powers so long as there is no demonstration
of partiality or appearance of partiality. Exercise of these powers does not
inherently endanger impartiality: even though the evidence presented
with judicial assistance will inevitably help one side or the other, courts
are permitted to produce evidence and question witnesses. The same
standard should apply here—that is, whether a court’s investigation of
fact demonstrates partiality is a separate question as it is with a judge’s
questioning of a witness. As the cases discussed herein demonstrate,
simply seeking and presenting additional information is not an indication
of a lack of impartiality.
CONCLUSION
Lessons from the 1960s–70s and the Chicago Eight trial? Social and
political crises are not new. Fifty years ago there was a period of serious
social breakdown: divisions, politicization, polarization, and distrust.
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Fifty years later we are experiencing it again, but with different contours
and in the presence of the powerful force of technology. Now, as then,
these social and political conflicts will play out in the courts. Now, as
then, judges are charged with maintaining public confidence in the
judicial system. To do so in the face of a “post-truth” world of alternative
facts, courts must ensure the factual integrity of their decisions. Perhaps
they should be more engaged in the process.

